

26 June 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director for Administration
VIA: Director of Security
STATINTL FROM: [REDACTED] Deputy Director of Security for Community Affairs
SUBJECT: DDA Role in Community Matters

1. Thank you for the discussion last week. I enjoyed it and appreciated your observations and candor. You won't forget to inquire about the possibility of getting my small staff into more representative space, will you?

2. You asked for my ideas on the role of the DDA under your Community Pink Hat.

3. As the Intelligence Agencies recognize and accept the new Executive Order and the DCI's efforts to meld the existing loose confederation of independent fiefdoms into a unified U.S. Intelligence effort, they have looked closer at the Pink and Blue structure of the CIA. The placement of the Security Committee under the Deputy to the DCI for Support was perceived as a precursor of efforts to encourage other elements of the traditional support mechanism to adopt common standards. That additional moves have not surfaced does not seem to have moderated the perception. It seems to members of the Community a question of "when" not "will" there be more amalgamation in the Community.

4. I think that willingness to participate in this centralization is at hand. The way the Community looks more and more to a Security Committee mechanism for addressing an increasing number of issues supports this. I don't mean that there is unanimity on all points, but the fact that almost 100 Security Officers of the Community are associated in one way or another makes this a platform broad enough to give exposure to most items of mutual interest.

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SUBJECT: DDA Role in Community Matters

5. The SECOM itself mirrors the membership of the NFIB. SECOM members are the heads of departmental security programs. They are contributing, active participants.

a. There are five subcommittees:

1. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures, chaired by CIA. They oversee the Community's [redacted] training facility at [redacted]

2. The R&D subcommittee, chaired by Phil Eckman, C/ORD/CIA.

3. Computer Security Subcommittee, chaired by [redacted] of NSA.

4. Compartmentation - APEX Subcommittee, chaired by Col. Robert Shiver, AF.

5. Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations Subcommittee, chaired by [redacted] of NSA's Office of General Counsel.

b. There are four standing Working Groups:

1. Security Advisory W.G. - USSR, chaired by Deputy Director of Security, State. Very active-
of continuing interest to the DCI and George [redacted] - with problems of a policy nature that you logically should be continuously aware of because of potential resource ramifications. Among these policy issues are:

a. State will need Community member assistance in many dimensions. We have already arranged for considerable R&D funding, training in security surveillance, personnel assistance from DoD, and equipment from NSA. CIA elements involved include OTS, ORD, OSO, OS and OTR. Will CIA provide more support?

b. There is a policy issue under debate about polygraphing U.S. construction workers. Viewed as the camel's nose in the tent, State and DoD are giving this matter high level

SUBJECT: DDA Role in Community Matters

attention to moderate the Presidential instruction that CIA will polygraph the construction workers. How far should CIA push for this program?

2. Security Education W.G., chaired by NSA. This group is very active. They have compiled a listing of all Community materials, aids and publications on security education and arranged for agencies to swap. Their latest effort was viewed by the Director and earned his commendation. He wants it used in the WH and the NSC and modified for use in industry.

3. Personnel Security Standards W.G., chaired until recent retirement by State's senior investigator, it is now chaired by a member of my office on detail from the AF.

Current efforts are directed toward generating recognition in the Community that there are benefits (security, time, dollars and manpower) in the adoption by all members of common standards of investigations and acceptance of each others clearances. There are several facets of this matter on which we are proceeding without the policy guidance your office could provide. Some of these are:

a. Should the polygraph be incorporated by all agencies in the investigative procedure leading to clearances for access to intelligence?

b. Should there be common investigative criteria (e.g., verify birth by personal check by investigators, verify education claims)?

c. Should the adjudication of investigative data be performed against common criteria? At this time there aren't any. Individuals acceptable to some agencies are not acceptable to others.

d. Should and can investigative results be exchanged among Community members? Does this include results of NSA's and CIA's polygraph interviews?

SUBJECT: DDA Role in Community Matters

e. Should the Intelligence Community have a common personal history statement (PHS)? Every agency now has its own. There would be advantages from the resource side if a common PHS could be adopted. But does CIA want to modify its form? Would they?

4. Physical Security Standards W.G., chaired by an FBI officer assigned to my office. This group is now addressing one of the most contentious bones in the security bag. There now exists a set of "minimum" DCI physical security standards. Each agency can add to them as it sees fit. This poses no problems for in-house applications. But in the expanding industrial sphere the add-on approach poses many resource intensive issues. CIA won't accept DIA's standards and NSA won't accept CIA's, etc. Industry has long pleaded for a set of "uniform" physical security standards. They don't care how tough or how expensive. They just wish the Government would get its act together so that industry could build areas just once rather than face expensive changes each time a different agency enters into a contractual arrangement. In the absence of basic policy direction (does the Community leadership desire "uniform" or "minimum" standards) we continue to muddle along and cannot seem to arrive at a unified position.

6. These issues are limited to the security dimension of support. There are other aspects of support which could profit from a forum like the Security Committee. I think the rapidly expanding scope of [redacted] tasks in his liaison assignment to State may be indicative of what I'm referring to. And in our discussion you mentioned the Community role of OTR and the possible benefits from closer Community relationships in Communications and the Computer field. I agree completely and would add Logistics.

7. The DCI has already demonstrated his eagerness to have focal points in the Community with the establishment of RM and CT. I think he would welcome and endorse further initiatives toward unification. The form of that initiative could be creation of a group of your peers from NFIB agencies. Certainly, the Security Committee could profit from advice and guidance such a group could provide. I think that the group

STATINTL

SUBJECT: DDA Role in Community Matters

would be able to look at issues and common problems without the provincialism and "turf" concerns that now direct much of our efforts and would serve to take some of the weight off the NFIB and the DCI. This DCI Support Committee could expand on the idea of implementing components like the Security Committee and establish a Communications Committee, Logistics Committee and a Computer Committee made up of departmental chiefs in these disciplines. This arrangement would effectively give the DCI a true focal point officer for support matters in the Community.

8. The basic authority for the DCI to approve establishment of such elements exist in E.O. 12036:

Section 1-601(b) "Be the head of the CIA and of such staff elements as may be required for discharges of the Director's Intelligence Community responsibilities."; and

Section 1-601(m) "Establish appropriate committees or other advisory groups to assist in the execution of the foregoing responsibilities."

The charter of such groups could readily be developed from other sections of E.O. 12036; specifically:

1-601(e) "Promote the development and maintenance of services of common concern by designated foreign intelligence organizations on behalf of the Intelligence Community."

1-601(h) "Conduct a program to protect against overclassification of foreign intelligence information."

1-601(i) "Ensure the establishment by the Intelligence Community of common security and access standards for managing and handling foreign intelligence systems, information and products."

1-604(b) "Providing policy, guidance and technical assistance to departments and agencies regarding protection of intelligence information, including information that may reveal intelligence sources and methods."

SUBJECT: DDA Role in Community Matters

9. As you can see, I endorse the concept of an Intelligence Community and I would be pleased to address it further if you are interested. I said I would send you a copy of the DCI's comment on the 1978 proposal to reorganize the Security Committee. It is attached.

STATINTL



Attachment

Distribution:

Orig - Adse
1 - D/Security

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

DCT: (Optional)

Approved For Release 2005/07/28 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000200070006-8

13-B 500-34

SCI Security Committee

D.R. 78-4925/1

IM: John F. Blake
 Deputy Director for Administration
 D 24 Hqs

EXTENSION

NO.

DDA 78-1034/1

DATE

31 March 1978

(Officer designation, room number, and
ding)

DATE

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)Director of Central
Intelligence

31 MAR 1978

Sgt

Stan:

I believe it appropriate to have
you sign the attached NFIB memo
concerning the Security Committee.

STATINTL

DCI

DDA

4/3/78

Sgt

DDA

3 APR 1978

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DDA

3 APR 1978

R

Registry file

Distribution:

- Orig RS - DCT
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - ER
- 2 - DDA

John F. Blake

Att.

T. Carlucci

DDA

STATINTL

Orig of Mr. Carlucci's Signed Memo for NFIB sent
to [redacted] IC Staff, 3 Apr 78, for dissemination.

STATINTL

INTERNAL
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31 MAR 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: DCI Security Committee

1. At the 14 March 1978 meeting of the Board, I announced the reassignment and subordination of the DCI Security Committee under the Deputy to the DCI for Support.

2. The Community Security Group (CSG) is hereby established in the office of the D/DCI for Support to serve as the focal point for Community Security affairs and to provide staff support to the DCI Security Committee. [] is appointed Chief, Community Security Group. He will concurrently function as Executive Secretary of the DCI Security Committee.

3. The Security Committee supported by the CSG will be responsible for advising me on all matters of Community concern with respect to security policy and management. The Security Committee will continue to function under the charter provisions of DCID No. 1/11 (effective 18 May 1976). The Community Security Group will subsume the compartmentation security policy responsibilities heretofore exercised by the Special Security Center, CIA.

4. The nucleus of the Community Security Group is being formed by the transfer of the positions until now associated with the Security Committee staff from the Intelligence Community Staff. The positions associated with compartmentation security policy functions in the Special Security Center, CIA are also being transferred to the Community Security Group. In addition, I am making other positions available from the CIA to complete the organization. Nominations will be invited in the near future from the NFIB agencies to fill some of the positions in the Group on a rotational, reimbursable basis.

5. Effective immediately Mr. Robert W. Gambino, Director of Security, CIA is appointed Chairman of the DCI Security Committee.

6. Effective 10 April 1978 the Community Security Group will be temporarily located in Room 3E 05, CIA Headquarters Building, telephone [] STATINTL

[] /s/ Frank C. Carlucci

STANSFIELD TURNER
Chairman

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Approved For Release 2005/07/28 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000200070006-8

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security
4E-60 Hqs.

EXTENSION NO.

10 MAR 1978

STATUTORY

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across columns after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. DDA 7D-18 Hqs	10 MAR 1978	✓		
2. ER	3/13/78	✓		RE
3. DDCI	13 MAR 1978	✓		P for NFB
4. DCI	3/13/78	✓		TUESDAY
5. EO/DDA	3/13/78	✓		VIEWS RE
6. ADDA	16 MAR 1978	✓		SECURITY Committee
7. DDA				ORGANIZED
8. D/Security				Tell to NFB
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Brent
10 Mar 1978
100-4925

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Security Committee Organization and
Staffing.

25X1

Sir:


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1. In anticipation of your 14 March 1978 appearance before NFIB, let me present an outline of tentative planning regarding the DCI Security Committee which you have already determined will operate in the future under the cognizance of the "Deputy to the DCI for Support." The preliminary thinking has been heavily influenced by two underlying convictions: (1) with the dedication of adequate resources together with proper commitment and application, much more can be accomplished in security on a Community level than in the past; and (2) while the Agency's Office of Security will contribute heavily, in manpower and expertise, to the effort, the staff support to the Security Committee should be concentrated in a discretely separate entity reporting to the D/DCI/Support side of my Office.

25X1

2. It is proposed that such a unit be organized as the "Community Security Group" (CSG) and be headed by an Office of Security supergrade who will also act as the Executive Secretary of the Security Committee. It is further proposed that CSG feature (as shown in attached chart) a three-branch breakdown with functions as indicated. A total staffing complement of nine professional officers is anticipated, seven to be drawn from the Office of Security and two coming from elsewhere in the Community to serve as Branch Chiefs, i.e., C/Facilities Security Branch and C/Personnel and Industrial Security Branch. (The two Branch Chiefs from the Community should be at least GS-15 level officers or O-6.) It is assumed these two posts would be filled by calling for nominations from the other Community agencies.

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3. The role of the Director of Security, CIA, is recognized as vital in the overall plan. He would act as Chairman of the Security Committee. In his absence, the SECOM meetings would be run by a Vice Chairman - the senior ranking officer on the Committee. The Director of Security will draw his staff support from the CSG to which he in turn will provide technical guidance and professional advice. Under this concept of a revitalized Security Committee, the participating agencies will be expected to name their most senior security officers their members. These officers will be expected to actively participate in SECOM meetings and activities.

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4. The planning projects, perhaps for the first time, a truly concerted attack on policy and implementation discrepancies between the agencies in all the major security dimensions. At the same time, the plan allows for the continuance, at least for a time, of the current subcommittee structure of SECOM. This is predicated on the belief that the Community Security Group can prod these subcommittees to significantly greater accomplishments.

25X1

5. Finally, establishment of the CSG will not require any new positions. It will involve transfer of the four positions (GS-17, GS-16, GS-14, GS-09) currently constituting the Security Committee Staff under the IC Staff from T/O to mine. To these I will add eight positions from the current DDA ceiling.

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John F. Blake

Att

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER

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
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